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Introduction

the protection of civilians requires an institutional separation
between them and combatants, such a divide may prevent the
repression of civilian activity which imperils that same protection.

he Club-K anti-ship missile system represents a new and
dangerous means of naval warfare, and one which existing international humanitarian law (IHL) is ill-equipped
to confront. Secreted inside the ubiquitous intermodal shipping
container and placed on the deck of a cargo carrier, the missile
system reveals itself only when the container roof opens, and the
missile rises from concealment and launches.1 As footage of test
launches and displays at defense exhibitions illustrate, the ClubK’s ease of transport and concealment offers obvious advantages
for a belligerent in an asymmetric conflict by allowing a readily available launch platform to approach high-value warships
unmolested and attack.2

Perfidy or Ruse
Question of Confidence
Although armies have employed deception since time immemorial, long-standing custom prohibits acts of treachery.4 This
juxtaposition is restated in Article 37 of Additional Protocol I of
the Geneva Convention, under which belligerents may employ
ruses of war but not “kill, injure or capture an adversary by
resort to perfidy,” that is, by exploiting the protection conferred
by IHL.5 Both Article 37 and the customary rule it embodies
apply to naval warfare, and as the San Remo Manual observes,
civilians at sea are generally
entitled to the same protection
in times of armed conflict as
those on land.6

While the only immediate victims of such an attack would be
enemy combatants who are lawful targets under IHL, the weapon’s
chameleon-like nature and
advertised method of employment indicate that it is likely to
be used to prepare and execute
an attack while feigning civilian status. Such tactics are an
example of perfidy, deliberately inducing trust on the part
of an adversary in order to
injure, kill, or capture them.3

The Club-K anti-ship missile
system represents a new and dangerous
means of naval warfare, and one which
existing international humanitarian law
is ill-equipped to confront.

Perfidy is composed of
three elements — the invitation of confidence, intention
to betray that confidence, and
fulfillment of that intention
by killing, injuring, or capturing the adversary.7 Although
it is not perfidious to merely
deploy the Club-K on a vessel, to use the weapon effectively its
deceptive qualities must be parlayed into the preparation and
execution of an attack under civilian guise. The example par
excellence is to place the weapon on a converted merchant vessel, as depicted by the manufacturers,8 and use the duo’s benign
appearance to deceive and attack an enemy warship. The nature
of the weapon therefore induces resort to tactics that exploit the
obligation of warships to distinguish themselves and to limit
attacks to military objectives, and thus constitute killing or injuring by resort to perfidy.

A well-recognized breach
of IHL, perfidy destroys the
mutual trust on which all other rules depend for compliance,
thereby sowing the seeds of further violations. In particular,
this article submits that weapons like the Club-K would lead a
belligerent, having recognized that apparently civilian vessels
have been used to attack its forces, to suspect that other civilian
vessels may be warships and attack them indiscriminately. Any
military advantage gained from the use of such weapons would
therefore come at the cost of increased risk to civilian life.
However, although it may undermine the distinction between
warships and civilian vessels, the fact that the Club-K is likely to
be used perfidiously would not necessarily inculpate the weapon’s
manufacturers. In particular, the structural discreteness
of the armed forces would make it difficult to prove a mental
nexus between the commanders who determine the method of
attack and the arms makers who provide the means. Thus, while

Potential for Deception
The essence of perfidy is the invitation of confidence—
the sowing of a belief in one’s adversary that they are legally
obliged to accord protection to the attacking party,9 of which
the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status is axiomatic.10
It is a cardinal rule of IHL, implicit in the proposition that
armed conflict is a state governed by law, that belligerents must
distinguish military objectives from civilians and attack only
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the former.11 Therefore, armed force may be used only against
vessels for which nature, location, purpose, or use makes an
effective contribution to military action and for which total or
partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite
military advantage.12

launch vessel is that depicted by the weapon’s manufacturers—a
converted merchant vessel. Although the manufacturers insist
that it cannot be placed on “any container carrier,” they do
expressly indicate that it is “designed for installation on the ships
called up for military service” rather than dedicated warships
such as “corvettes, frigates, destroyers [and] cruisers.”23 That is,
it is intended to be deployed on merchant vessels requisitioned
for naval service. Such conversion of civilian ships to military
use, including participation in hostilities, is lawful provided that
they are marked and registered as set out above.

The corollary of this rule is that those bearing arms must
distinguish themselves. Military forces on the battlefield constitute an exceptional subdivision of human society, in that as
between themselves they may do acts ordinarily considered
criminal, provided they are identifiable by insignia, open carriage of arms, and other means.13 Both rules represent the same
fundamental tenet—that warfare is a relation between states alone
and so to wage “total war,” that is, war without discrimination
between a state’s military organs and the civilian population, is
prohibited.14 All of the subsidiary protections extended to civilians flow from this legal and practical distinction between them
and combatants.

Due to their design, however, merchant vessels are easily
adaptable only to logistical, rather than combat functions.24 And
even if technically feasible, giving a merchant vessel all the
combat capabilities of a true warship would, for the reasons set
out above, imbue it with a conspicuously military appearance. To
realize the deceptive potential of the Club-K, the attacker must
rather eschew the ability to defend themselves and stake success
on the launch vessel’s civilian appearance. Notwithstanding the
long range of Club-type missiles,25 it is unlikely that the launch
vessel could otherwise safely approach a superior enemy force.
In the ordinary course of events, therefore, the abuse of confidence would be both a causal precondition of the attack and
intended as the ideal or indeed only possible avenue for success.

Therefore, to be armed and participate in hostilities, warships
must be operated by state naval forces, distinguished by external
markings, and listed on a public register.15 Warships may, in
turn, be attacked at any time. Merchant vessels are ordinarily
subject only to search and seizure but may not carry offensive
weaponry or use armed force except in self-defense.16 A merchant vessel’s legal protection therefore depends on its practical
exclusion from hostilities, and to arm it with anti-ship missiles
and thereby integrate it into a belligerent’s war effort exposes it
to attack.17 However, if weapons like the Club-K and other distinctively military features could be concealed, the vessel could
maintain both a powerful armament and the pretense that it is
legally protected, thus inviting the confidence of an adversary.

Ruses of War
If using the Club-K to kill or injure under cover of civilian
status is perfidious, there remains the question of when feigning
such status passes from ruse of war to perfidy. Ruses—deceptive measures which neither infringe a rule of law nor invite the
confidence of an adversary with respect to its protection—are
expressly permitted by Additional Protocol I.26 Submarines and
landmines, for example, use deception more or less continually,
but the analogy which the Club-K’s manufacturers draw with
them is incorrect—submarines and landmines conceal themselves using the natural environment, not by feigning civilian
status. Moreover, as stated above, use of landmines disguised as
innocuous items is prohibited.27

Betrayal and Intent
However, perfidy requires more than mere deception, and
it is not perfidious to merely place a containerized missile
launcher or other concealed armament on a vessel. The language
of Additional Protocol I, which refers to killing or injuring “by
resort to perfidy,” imports a causal link between the betrayal of
confidence and the killing or wounding of enemy personnel.18
To constitute a single transaction and thus an instance of perfidy,
the invitation of confidence must be the “proximate cause” of
the subsequent attack.19 Perfidy also has a subjective aspect, the
intention to abuse the protection conferred by IHL.20

However, the established usages of naval warfare do allow
warships to fly false flags and feign the appearance of merchant
vessels provided that they show their “true colors” before going
“into action,” “actual armed engagement,” or “launching an
attack.”28 This is in contrast to hospital ships and other vessels
having special protection, the imitation of which is prohibited
at all times.29 If IHL grants warships this license to invite the
confidence of an adversary when not participating in hostilities,
can the Club-K be used consistently therewith?

For these causal and subjective elements to be present, the
Club-K must be an effective cloak for the launch vessel’s true
nature. As discussed above, it could conceal one obvious feature, but to invite and betray the confidence of an adversary the
launch vessel would need to eschew all outward signs of military
character, whether visual, acoustic, or electronic. In this respect,
the Club-K differs from weapons which are of themselves inherently perfidious and unlawful, such as landmines disguised as
innocuous items. To be effective, the Club-K must be married to
other deceptive measures.21

Total War
Since armed forces seldom publicize the deceptive measures
they employ, such acts remain clandestine and thus incapable of
inducing reliance by others.30 One must therefore look to history for concrete state practice. For a weapon like the Club-K to
appear only at the moment it is fired is consistent with the way
that converted merchant vessels and enemy uniforms were used
for deception during World War II, but the context in which such
tactics were employed raises its own legal problems.

Warships require an extensive suite of weapons to engage
and defend against air and seaborne targets, as well as a correspondingly large crew.22 Since the signature hull, superstructure,
marks, lighting, and electronic emissions of a dedicated warship
would deprive the Club-K of deceptive value, the only suitable
23
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At sea, both sides employed converted merchant vessels
which literally dropped the façade concealing their armament
moments before opening fire.31 British “Q-ships,” for example,
masqueraded as merchantmen to provoke German submarines
to recklessly attack an apparently vulnerable target. However,
the circumstances of
total war then prevailing call into
question the continued relevance of
such practice.

Therefore, a vessel using the Club-K could not conceal its
true nature up until the moment of launch. Modern law requires
that the disguise be discarded once the intent to attack is formed
and, at any rate, before preparation of the attack. Like many
other rules embodied in Additional Protocol I, this is essentially
a reflection of the
greater protection
now accorded to
civilians and the
world’s rejection of
total war. However,
by effectively requiring a belligerent to
act
perfidiously,
the Club-K would
encourage exactly
this method of
warfare.

Perfidious methods of warfare not only expose
combatants to being treacherously killed or
wounded—they also undermine the longstanding
compromise between belligerent rights of warships
and neutral rights of free navigation.

These tactics were
considered during the
Nuremberg trial, in
which admirals Karl
Doenitz and Erich
Raeder were charged
with waging unrestricted submarine warfare. The International
Military Tribunal (IMT) held that the total integration of Britain’s
merchant navy into the war effort exposed its vessels to attack
because they constituted what would now be termed military
objectives.32 Since Germany conducted hostilities on precisely
that basis, Q-ships could not and did not purport to be protected
against attack—their appearance was designed to invite rather
than discourage attack. Moreover, since they were justified as
a reprisal for unrestricted submarine warfare, they provide no
evidence of opinio juris and hence of customary law.33

The Cordon Sanitaire and Free Navigation
of the High Seas
Perfidious methods of warfare not only expose combatants to
being treacherously killed or wounded—they also undermine the
longstanding compromise between belligerent rights of warships
and neutral rights of free navigation. Naval warfare occurs largely
in the international realm of the high seas, where the practice of
re-flagging allows a belligerent to conceal both its warships and
maritime supply lines.39 Warships may therefore direct belligerent
measures against vessels of actual or ostensible neutrality.40 For
reasons of self-defense, warships may also establish a cordon sanitaire, or exclusion zone, allowing them to pre-emptively attack
approaching vessels.41 The dangers inherent in such prerogatives
are controlled by a regime safeguarding free navigation.42

Battlefield deception was also dealt with in the Skorzeny
Case, so named for the German colonel whose commando wore
Allied uniforms up until the moment of opening fire.34 In this
respect, it should be noted that the case did not concern imitation
of civilians, which directly impinges on the principle of distinction. Nevertheless, the fact that Skorzeny was acquitted because
his stratagem was regarded as lawful by several states does suggest that some deceptive measures could be lawfully employed
as ruses as long as they were discontinued immediately before
firing on an adversary.

Insofar as it corresponds to the point at which approaching
vessels constitute threats whose destruction is militarily advantageous, the cordon is the geographical expression of the principle
of distinction as the boundary of warfare. An excessive cordon,
however, simply leads to indiscriminate attacks. The San Remo
Manual affirms that the declaration of such zones does not abrogate the duty to distinguish between military objectives and other
vessels.43 However, that conclusion was not unanimous among its
framers, and a belligerent anticipating that any merchant vessel
may carry anti-ship missiles is likely to employ particularly drastic
measures in self-defense—to the detriment of enemy and neutral
shipping alike.

Limited War
A significant number of states have since prohibited the use
of enemy uniforms to “favor” or “impede” military operations,
signifying a hardening of attitudes toward such deception even
outside of combat stricto sensu.35 And, of more direct relevance
to the imitation of civilians, Article 44(3) of Additional Protocol
I requires regular forces on land to distinguish themselves
from civilians during military operations preparatory to an
attack—a reflection of the importance now accorded to the
principle of distinction.36

During the First Gulf War, excessive exclusion zones were
repeatedly condemned for facilitating indiscriminate attacks on
neutral vessels.44 In a tragic epilogue, the intervention of neutral
states would later affirm how easily tragedy can result from
misidentification in a high-traffic maritime environment, with
a number of civilian vessels being destroyed after approaching warships.45 As the experience of the World Wars and more
recent conflicts show, methods of war which erase the distinction
between military and civilian vessels lead others—consciously
or not—to reciprocate and are therefore to be denounced.46

With respect to naval warfare, the San Remo Manual states
that the Q-ship may no longer lawfully operate in the context
of limited warfare. Such vessels are said to exemplify the “crucial element” of perfidy—the simulation of protected status
while “an act of hostility is prepared and executed.”37 This
notion—that perfidy includes deception during preparation of
an attack—accords with Additional Protocol I, which refers to
an act of deception done with intent to kill, wound or capture.38
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Weapons of Deceit and International Law

combatants who physically commit the crime. Just as the horrors
of war are contained by the obligation of combatants to distinguish themselves, they are also controlled by the demand that
combatants operate under responsible command. Indeed, it is the
fact of a command hierarchy culminating in a supreme political
authority that defines warfare as a relation between states.50

Although belligerents may employ ruses, to use a concealed
weapon such as the Club-K to prepare and execute an attack while
feigning civilian status crosses the border from lawful deception
to perfidy—the intentional abuse of legal protection to kill, injure,
or capture an adversary. Only warships enjoy belligerent rights
and are therefore always subject to attack. Merchant vessels are
prohibited from participating in hostilities and are ordinarily subject only to search and seizure. Therefore, for a warship to imitate
such vessels invites others to accord it concomitant protection.

However, the State is not solely responsible for crimes committed by members of its armed forces—it is well-accepted that
military commanders and civilian superiors are responsible for
offences committed on their orders.51 Nonetheless, given the
law’s record of inconsistent enforcement—including against
popular military figures—one might reasonably risk prosecution
for the prospect of military gain. Perfidy was, for example, committed systematically by Iraqi forces in the Third Gulf War.52

Although such measures are permitted when not preparing
or executing an attack, a vessel armed with the Club-K would
most likely ensure its success by acting in a designedly treacherous fashion, feigning civilian status throughout an engagement.
The objects and purposes of IHL dictate that such tactics be
recognized as perfidious, for they would provoke belligerents to
collapse the distinction between military and civilian vessels on
which the very rule of law in naval warfare depends.47

Unlike such individual combatants, a weapon as large and
complex as an anti-ship missile cannot easily be made to look
innocuous. However, having been consciously designed to mimic
civilian objects, the Club-K provides a ready means to attack
while feigning civilian status. Moreover, as discussed in Part I,
successfully deploying the weapon from a merchant vessel, as
envisaged by the manufacturers, appears to depend largely on
resort to perfidy. In that respect, design decisions at the logistical stage can influence military decisions in combat. The best
vehicle for deterrence may, therefore, be the businessperson who
provides the weapon.53 Arguably, if they play a major role in a
chain of events likely to lead to a violation of IHL, they ought to
be criminally responsible,54 but would they be?

This endangers not only vessels and abstract economic interests but also the life and security of civilians on the high seas. The
victims of naval warfare during the World Wars are a sufficient
testament to that fact—one of many that lead states to adopt rules
ending the practice of total war. However, as more recent conflicts
illustrate, those rules are only as strong as the good faith and trust
which a belligerent reposes in adhering to them—trust which perfidy, more than any other violation of IHL, destroys.

Repression of Perfidious Methods of Warfare

Manufacturer’s Liability

Prosecution and Arms Control

International criminal law recognizes many doctrines of
complicity, but this article focuses on aiding and abetting—the
traditional basis for prosecuting providers of means. So as to
avoid compounding a hypothetical situation with hypothetical
or untested law, this article does not consider the prosecution
of juridical persons or complicity under the nascent law of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) but
focuses on customary law on aiding and abetting by businesspersons acting through a corporate instrumentality.

If the Club-K is likely to be used perfidiously, this raises the
question of how such acts can be repressed. Alongside explicit
provision in the Rome Statute, perfidy has long been recognized
as a war crime under customary law, opening up criminal prosecution as one remedy.48 However, despite a marked resurgence in the
post-Cold War era, war crimes trials are not free of legal problems.
The example of the Club-K exemplifies one such issue, namely
establishing the responsibility of accomplices. Accomplices frequently play a vital role in facilitating a war crime, in particular
by providing the means for its commission. Targeting both the
principal offender and accomplices therefore multiplies the value
of international law as a deterrent and crime prevention tool.49
However, the mens rea required for criminal guilt under international law on complicity raises difficult questions of proof.
Although arms control law presents an alternative, comprehensive
prohibitions may be politically unachievable. Each avenue theoretically allows international law to be enforced on the battlefield
by pursuing sanctions and criminal liability “behind the lines,” but
both illustrate the difficulty of doing so.

The archetypal case in this context is Zyklon B, in which the
manufacturers of the eponymous toxin were held responsible
for its use in concentration camp gas chambers because they
had actual knowledge of that use. This mens rea requirement—
cognizance that the customer intends to use one’s product to
commit a crime—is broadly reflected in other Allied trials of
German industrialists.55
However, as these trials illustrate, commercial actors present
particular difficulties because they typically undertake “neutral”
actions, providing material assistance, such as money or consumables, which is amenable to legitimate uses. In acquiring
such an item, the customer might not thereby put the seller on
notice of their intent to commit a war crime.

Complicity and Deterrence

For example, at Nuremberg, the IMT held that to be implicated in a conspiracy to wage aggressive war, an accused had
to know of a “concrete plan . . . clearly outlined in its criminal
purpose.”56 Circumstances such as rearmament merely disclosed
Hitler’s militaristic ideology,57 and businessmen who equipped

Command and Supply
When considering prosecution for crimes committed in
combat, attention often falls first on the commander who orders
a military operation due to the control which he exercises over
25
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his armies were acquitted of aggression in the IG Farben Case.58
By contrast, the Zyklon B accused knew of both the lethal
properties of their insecticide and its ongoing use in the Nazi
Holocaust, thus proving intent and knowledge sufficient to make
them “concerned in” the commission of war crimes.59

an inquiry into the state of mind of the manufacturers vis-à-vis the
weapon’s future use, bearing in mind that it has a range of possible
applications. Such a definition would merely reframe, rather than
overcome, the issues arising in criminal proceedings.
An alternative is to refer to weapons which outwardly resemble
civilian objects, thus placing the emphasis on an objective characteristic rather than subjective questions and hypothetical situations.
However, such a ban raises vexing policy questions. As discussed
in Part I, the gravamen of perfidy and what distinguishes it from
ruses is the deliberate exploitation of IHL
to attack an adversary. Thus, whether it is
lawful for a warship to feign civilian status depends on whether it is preparing an
attack at the time.

The Club-K poses the same issue as the IG Farben Case, in
that the formation of a concrete plan to use the weapon perfidiously would depend on tactical decisions made by the belligerent after it is supplied. And although the Club-K is marketed as
a weapon of disguise, unlike warships,
military vehicles and installations on land
are not obliged to distinguish themselves,
and therefore the weapon could lawfully
be deployed from an apparently civilian truck or train as a deceptive trap.60
At most, the manufacturers are likely
to be aware that their product might
be used perfidiously at some undefined
point in the future.61 In this respect,
the Club-K stands in contrast to weapons that cannot but be used unlawfully,
the aforementioned booby trap being the
quintessential example.

In safeguarding humanity in
time of armed conflict, then,
there can be no substitute for
inculcating among the armed
forces a culture of respect for
the rule of law, and education
in its precepts.

A prohibition omitting any nexus to
the distinction, which IHL draws between
perfidy and ruse, would therefore tend
to impede the use of legitimate forms of
deception. Although this does not foreclose on any possibility of treaty action,
the prerogative to use deception during
armed conflict has generally been jealously guarded.65 And, as illustrated by the
United States’ refusal to ban landmines
without a geographical exception for the Korean De-Militarized
Zone, states are often reticent to completely forego weapons with some residual military utility, even if it is narrowly
circumscribed.66

This is not to say that the manufacturers will invariably be shielded by the fungibility of their wares.
For example, German steel magnate Friedrich Flick was found to
be complicit in the crimes of the Nazi SS, due to the considerable
sums that he donated to its head, Heinrich Himmler. The fact that
Flick was not aware of the specific activity to which the money
was applied was held to be no defense because the notoriety of
the SS was such as to charge him with knowledge that it would
be criminal.62

Conclusion
The Club-K therefore poses a problematic issue for the law
of naval warfare, both in terms of the limits of its lawful use and
the repression of unlawful use. Since merchant vessels are not
ordinarily exposed to attack, to deliberately exploit their appearance to penetrate a warship’s defenses and attack it amounts
to perfidy. Such conduct endangers the civilian shipping of all
nations and is not only unlawful but deservedly criminal. As past
conflicts illustrate, indiscriminate naval warfare occasions more
than damaged vessels and abstract economic loss—it injures and
kills individuals whose only protection in the international realm
of the high seas is states’ respect for the rule of law.

Flick suggests that the manufacturers could be held responsible
if the use to which the Club-K is put is simply the continuation
of an established record of perfidy, common knowledge of
which bridges the mens rea gap. On the other hand, it would not
readily apply to a peacetime transaction where the possibility
of perfidy is merely latent and the manufacturers, due to their
structural separation from their customer’s armed forces, are
not privy to its plans. It is precisely due to chaotic and brutal
nature of war that the principle of distinction must be respected.
However, ironically, the entrenched separation of the military
and civilian spheres can make it impossible to connect the acts
of military commanders in the wartime context with the acts of
civilian businesspeople who are deliberately excluded from it.

While this opens the door to prosecution of military commanders, the rules of complicity applied by international tribunals are unlikely to net the businesspeople who supply such
arms due to the difficulty of proving that they knew of a plan
to use the weapon perfidiously. Although arms control law may
obviate the need to prove any objective and subjective nexus
between supplying the weapon and using it treacherously, states
are unlikely to eschew its very possession.

Arms Control Law — A De Lege Ferenda?
If a weapon’s manufacturers cannot be made responsible
for its subsequent perfidious use, the remedy may be to
make their conduct the primary locus for legal sanctions, by
prohibiting the development, manufacture, and distribution of
the Club-K and similar arms outright, as has been done with
chemical and biological weapons.63 This course, however, poses
a number of problems.

The example of criminal prosecution, in particular, illustrates
that the separation of the military and civilian spheres that IHL
aims to preserve can impede its own enforcement. Although the
principle of distinction between combatants and civilians must
be upheld, it may be difficult to do so by policing the civilians
who operate on the periphery of armed conflict. In safeguarding
humanity in time of armed conflict, then, there can be no substitute for inculcating among the armed forces a culture of respect
for the rule of law and education in its precepts.

In particular, there is the definition of the banned item. Treaties
typically refer to weapons “designed” to have certain technical
characteristics or effects, such as poisoning.64 Although a treaty
might prohibit weapons designed to facilitate perfidy, this involves
26

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 4

Endnotes
1

24

Robert Hewson, Concealed-carriage Klub-K changes cruise
missiles rules, Janes Def. Wkly., Apr. 14, 2010, at 5.
2 Club-K Container Missile System is on a trial [sic], Concern
Morinformsystem-Agat (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.concern-agat
.com/press-center/press-release/383-club-k-fire; IMDS-2011 ClubK-40 Real, Concern Morinformsystem-Agat (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KWsThvJpT8I&list=UUCB5o0o
p5E12aa55Y61nMbA&index=4&feature=plcp.
3 International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts
at Sea 186 §111(a) (1995) [hereinafter San Remo Manual].
4 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Lousie Doswald-Beck, Customary
International Humanitarian Law 203-205, 221-226 (2009).
5 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts art. 37, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I].
6 1 Claude Pilloud et al., Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, §§ 1500, 1582 (1987); San Remo Manual, supra
note 3, §§ 39–39.2.
7 1 Pilloud et al., supra 6, at § 1500.
8 Club-K Container Missile System, Concern MorinformsystemAgat (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) http://www.concern-agat.com/
products/defense-products/81-concern-agat/189-club-k.
9 Dieter Fleck, Ruses of War and Prohibition of Perfidy, 13 Mil.
L. & L. War Rev. 269, 288 (1974).
10 1 Pilloud et al., supra note 6, at §§ 1503, 1506.
11 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 114–115 (June 27); Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, at 257 (July 8).
12 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, arts. 48, 51, 52; San Remo
Manual, supra note 3, at §§ 40–41.
13 Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population,
in Handbook of International Humanitarian Law 238 § 501.1
(Dieter Fleck ed., 2008).
14 Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in Handbook of
International Humanitarian Law, supra note 13, at 119 § 401.1.
15 Hague Convention VII Relating to the Conversion of Merchant
Ships into Warships, arts. 1–4, 6, Oct. 18, 1907, [1910] UKTS 11.
16 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856,
61 U.K. Parl. Papers (H.C. and Cmnd.) 153; Institute of
International Law, Manual of the Laws of Naval War arts. 3-6,
8, 12 (1913).
17 W.J. Fenrick, Legal Aspects of Targeting in the Law of Naval
Warfare, 29 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 238, 270–275 (1991); San Remo
Manual, supra note 3, §§ 59, 60(f), 60.11–60.14.
18 1 Pilloud et al., supra note 6, at § 1492.
19 International and Operational Law Department, The Judge
Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Operational Law
Handbook 25, § 2.XI.C.1 (2011); William H. Ferrell, No Shirt, No
Shoes, No Status: Uniforms, Distinction, and Special Operations
in International Armed Conflict, 178 Mil. L. Rev. 94, 119 (2003).
20 Henckaerts, supra note 4, at R. 65; 1 Pilloud et al., supra note
6, at § 1500.
21 See e.g. 1 Pilloud et al., supra note 6, at §§ 1517–1519.
22 Massimo Annati, Primary Weapon Systems for Naval Platforms,
Mil. Tech., Aug. 2008, at 82.
23 Club-K Container Missile System, Concern MorinformsystemAgat (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.concern-agat.com/press-center/
press-release/204-pressrelease-club-k.

Roger Villar, Merchant Ships at War: The Falklands
Experience 12–13, 23–27 (1984).
25 Michal Fiszer and Jerzy Gruszczynski, Cruiser and Destroyer
Killers, J. of Electronic Def., Nov. 2011, at 51, 56, 58.
26 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 37(2).
27 1 Pilloud et al., supra note 6, at § 1507; cf. Club-K Container
Missile System, supra note 23.
28 U.K. Ministry of Defence, The Joint Service Manual of the Law
of Armed Conflict §§ 13.82, 13.83 (2004) (permitting the ‘disguising
[of] ships to appear to be different’ subject to the prohibition of
perfidious attacks); U.S. Dept. of the Navy Et Al., The Commander’s
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations §§ 12.3.1, 12.7 (2007).
29 San Remo Manual, supra note 3, at §§ 110–111.
30 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 80, 87 (2008).
31 E.g. Memorandum of the German Government in Regard to
Incidents Alleged to have Attended the Destruction of a German
Submarine and its Crew by the British Auxiliary Crusier “Baralong”
on August 19, 1915, and Reply of the British Government Thereto,
10 Am. J. Int’l L. 79 (1916).
32 United States v. Goering (Int’l Mil. Trib., 1946), in 1 Trial of
the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November–1 October 1946 311–312,
317 (Secretariat of the IMT ed., 1947) [hereinafter IMT]; See also
San Remo Manual, supra note 3, at § 45.3; Robert W. Tucker, The
Law of War and Neutrality at Sea 62–63, 68–69 (1955).
33 San Remo Manual, supra note 3, at § 60.8; see also George K.
Walker, The Tanker War, 1980–88: Law and Policy 403 (2000).
Contra Christopher Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry at the Start
of the New Millennium, in The Law of Armed Conflict 185, 204
(Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998).
34 Trial of Otto Skorzeny and Others (Gen. Mil. Govt. Ct., 1947)
(U.S.), in 9 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 92–93 (U.N.
War Crimes Comm’n ed., 1947–1949) [hereinafter L.R.T.W.C.].
35 Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 4, at 62
36 Cf. Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 4, 106.
37 San Remo Manual, supra note 3, at § 111 (emphasis added).
38 1 Pilloud et al., supra note 6, at §§ 1506–1507.
39 von Heinegg, supra note 13, at 486-87.
40 Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties
of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 723;
see generally Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in Handbook
of International Humanitarian Law 581 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2008).
41 See generally Walker, supra note 33, at 398–410.
42 Hague Convention (XIII) supra note 40; Bothe, supra note 13,
at 571.
43 San Remo Manual, supra note 3, § 106.
44 E.g. S.C. Res. 552, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/552
(June 1, 1984); S.C. Res. 582, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/582
(Feb. 24, 1986); S.C. Res. 598, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/598
(July 20, 1987).
45 Walker, supra note 33, at 413–14.
46 Matthew G. Morris, ‘Hiding Amongst a Crowd’ and the Illegality
of Deceptive Lighting, 54 Naval L. Rev. 235, 255–56 (2007).
47 Oeter, supra note 14, at 227-28.
48 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xi).
8(2)(e)(ix), July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute];
2 Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 4, 1447.
49 2 International Commission of Jurists, Corporate Complicity
& Legal Accountability 12 (2008).
50 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 43(1); See Ipsen,
Combatants and Non-Combatants, Handbook of International
Humanitarian Law, supra note 13, at 81.

27

Clarke: The Club-K Anti-Ship Missile System: A Case Study in Perfidy and
51 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5, arts. 86(2), 87;
Rome Statute, supra note 48, art. 28.
52 Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq, 1-12 (Human Rights Watch, 2003).
53 Wim Huisman & Elies Van Sliedregt, Rogue Traders: Dutch
Businessmen, International Crimes and Corporate Complicity,
8 J. Int’l Crim. Justice 803, 825–826 (2010).
54 Steffen Wirth, Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Trial Judgment,
10 J. Int’l Crim. Justice 971, 978 (2012).
55 Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, (British Mil. Ct, 1946),
1 L.R.T.W.C., supra note 34, at 93. See also United States v. Flick,
(Mil. Trib. IV, 1947), 6 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No.
10, at 1217 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. ed. 1951). [hereinafter T.W.C.];
United States v. Krauch, (Mil. Trib. VI, 1948), 8 T.W.C. at 1137,
1141, 1146, 1153; United States v. Krupp, (Mil. Trib. IIIA, 1948),
9 T.W.C. at 1448–49.
56 United States v. Goering, 1 IMT, supra note 32, at 225.
57 Goering, 1 IMT, at 307–309; Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing
Business With the Devil: The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate
Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F.L. Rev. 167, 175–177 (2005).
58 Krauch, 8 T.W.C., at 1116;
cf. id. at 1169, 1172.
59 Trial of Bruno Tesch, 1 L.R.T.W.C, at 93.

60

Fleck, Ruses, supra note 9, at 295-296; Program on
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard Univ.,
Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International Law
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare 257 § 116(e)(3) (2010)
available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/Commentary%20on%20
the%20HPCR%20Manual.pdf.
61 Christoph Burchard, Ancillary and Neutral Business Contributions
to ‘Corporate-Political Core Crime’: Initial Enquiries Concerning
the Rome Statute, 8 J. Int’l Crim. Justice 919, 944 (2010).
62 United States v. Flick, (Mil. Trib. IV, 1947),
6 T.W.C. No. 10 at 1220–21 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. ed. 1951).
63 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons
and on Their Destruction art. 1, Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 UNTS 163;
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
art. 1, Sept. 3, 1992, 1974 UNTS 45 [hereinafter Chemical
Weapons Convention].
64 E.g. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 63, art. 1(b).
65 See e.g. 1 Pilloud et al., supra note 6, at § 1506.
66 Thomas R. Phillips, No Meeting of the Mines: An Analysis of
the U.S. Policy Regarding the International Ban on Anti-Personnel
Landmines (The Ottawa Convention), 13 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J.
25, 44–46 (1996).

28

